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Ian Gonzalez
Ian Gonzalez

LG Smart Recovery Center.iso __FULL__



I have download your LG smart recovery software but it just support a .LSI format for backup files. I have LG-c400 and my backup files have .wsi and .dsi file formats. Can you please provide a recovery with said file formats.




LG Smart Recovery Center.iso


Download File: https://www.google.com/url?q=https%3A%2F%2Furlcod.com%2F2u4i3s&sa=D&sntz=1&usg=AOvVaw2IkC-H_u0QYzOjna-cFWNt



Organizations can use BitLocker recovery information saved in Active Directory Domain Services (AD DS) to access BitLocker-protected data. It's recommended to create a recovery model for BitLocker while planning for BitLocker deployment.


BitLocker recovery is the process by which access can be restored to a BitLocker-protected drive if the drive can't be unlocked normally. In a recovery scenario, the following options to restore access to the drive are available:


The user can supply the recovery password. If the organization allows users to print or store recovery passwords, the users can enter in the 48-digit recovery password that they printed or stored on a USB drive or with a Microsoft account online. Saving a recovery password with a Microsoft account online is only allowed when BitLocker is used on a PC that isn't a member of a domain.


Data recovery agents can use their credentials to unlock the drive. If the drive is an operating system drive, the drive must be mounted as a data drive on another computer for the data recovery agent to unlock it.


A domain administrator can obtain the recovery password from AD DS and use it to unlock the drive. Storing recovery passwords in AD DS is recommended to provide a way for IT professionals to be able to obtain recovery passwords for drives in an organization if needed. This method makes it mandatory to enable this recovery method in the BitLocker group policy setting Choose how BitLocker-protected operating system drives can be recovered located at Computer Configuration > Administrative Templates > Windows Components > BitLocker Drive Encryption > Operating System Drives in the Local Group Policy Editor. For more information, see BitLocker Group Policy settings.


On PCs that use BitLocker Drive Encryption, or on devices such as tablets or phones that use BitLocker Device Encryption only, when an attack is detected, the device will immediately reboot and enter into BitLocker recovery mode. To take advantage of this functionality, administrators can set the Interactive logon: Machine account lockout threshold Group Policy setting located in Computer Configuration > Windows Settings > Security Settings > Local Policies > Security Options in the Local Group Policy Editor. Or they can use the MaxFailedPasswordAttempts policy of Exchange ActiveSync (also configurable through Microsoft Intune), to limit the number of failed password attempts before the device goes into Device Lockout.


On devices with TPM 1.2, changing the BIOS or firmware boot device order causes BitLocker recovery. However, devices with TPM 2.0 don't start BitLocker recovery in this case. TPM 2.0 doesn't consider a firmware change of boot device order as a security threat because the OS Boot Loader isn't compromised.


Modifying the Platform Configuration Registers (PCRs) used by the TPM validation profile. For example, including PCR[1] would result in BitLocker measuring most changes to BIOS settings, causing BitLocker to enter recovery mode even when non-boot critical BIOS settings change.


Some computers have BIOS settings that skip measurements to certain PCRs, such as PCR[2]. Changing this setting in the BIOS would cause BitLocker to enter recovery mode because the PCR measurement will be different.


Having a BIOS, UEFI firmware, or an option ROM component that isn't compliant with the relevant Trusted Computing Group standards for a client computer. For example, a non-compliant implementation may record volatile data (such as time) in the TPM measurements, causing different measurements on each startup and causing BitLocker to start in recovery mode.


Before beginning recovery, it is recommend to determine what caused recovery. This might help prevent the problem from occurring again in the future. For instance, if it is determined that an attacker has modified the computer by obtaining physical access, new security policies can be created for tracking who has physical presence. After the recovery password has been used to recover access to the PC, BitLocker reseals the encryption key to the current values of the measured components.


For planned scenarios, such as a known hardware or firmware upgrades, initiating recovery can be avoided by temporarily suspending BitLocker protection. Because suspending BitLocker leaves the drive fully encrypted, the administrator can quickly resume BitLocker protection after the planned task has been completed. Using suspend and resume also reseals the encryption key without requiring the entry of the recovery key.


Recovery has been described within the context of unplanned or undesired behavior. However, recovery can also be caused as an intended production scenario, for example in order to manage access control. When desktop or laptop computers are redeployed to other departments or employees in the enterprise, BitLocker can be forced into recovery before the computer is given to a new user.


Before a thorough BitLocker recovery process is created, it's recommended to test how the recovery process works for both end users (people who call the helpdesk for the recovery password) and administrators (people who help the end user get the recovery password). The -forcerecovery command of manage-bde.exe is an easy way to step through the recovery process before users encounter a recovery situation.


Recovery triggered by -forcerecovery persists for multiple restarts until a TPM protector is added or protection is suspended by the user. When using Modern Standby devices (such as Surface devices), the -forcerecovery option is not recommended because BitLocker will have to be unlocked and disabled manually from the WinRE environment before the OS can boot up again. For more information, see BitLocker Troubleshooting: Continuous reboot loop with BitLocker recovery on a slate device.


When planning the BitLocker recovery process, first consult the organization's current best practices for recovering sensitive information. For example: How does the enterprise handle lost Windows passwords? How does the organization perform smart card PIN resets? These best practices and related resources (people and tools) can be used to help formulate a BitLocker recovery model.


Organizations that rely on BitLocker Drive Encryption and BitLocker To Go to protect data on a large number of computers and removable drives running the Windows 11, Windows 10, Windows 8, or Windows 7 operating systems and Windows to Go should consider using the Microsoft BitLocker Administration and Monitoring (MBAM) Tool version 2.0, which is included in the Microsoft Desktop Optimization Pack (MDOP) for Microsoft Software Assurance. MBAM makes BitLocker implementations easier to deploy and manage and allows administrators to provision and monitor encryption for operating system and fixed drives. MBAM prompts the user before encrypting fixed drives. MBAM also manages recovery keys for fixed and removable drives, making recovery easier to manage. MBAM can be used as part of a Microsoft System Center deployment or as a stand-alone solution. For more info, see Microsoft BitLocker Administration and Monitoring.


After a BitLocker recovery has been initiated, users can use a recovery password to unlock access to encrypted data. Consider both self-recovery and recovery password retrieval methods for the organization.


In some cases, users might have the recovery password in a printout or a USB flash drive and can perform self-recovery. It's recommended that the organization creates a policy for self-recovery. If self-recovery includes using a password or recovery key stored on a USB flash drive, the users must be warned not to store the USB flash drive in the same place as the PC, especially during travel. For example, if both the PC and the recovery items are in the same bag it would be easy for access to be gained to the PC by an unauthorized user. Another policy to consider is having users contact the Helpdesk before or after performing self-recovery so that the root cause can be identified.


If the user doesn't have a recovery password printed or on a USB flash drive, the user will need to be able to retrieve the recovery password from an online source. If the PC is a member of a domain, the recovery password can be backed up to AD DS. However, back up of the recovery password to AD DS does not happen by default. Backup of the recovery password to AD DS has to be configured via the appropriate group policy settings before BitLocker was enabled on the PC. BitLocker group policy settings can be found in the Local Group Policy Editor or the Group Policy Management Console (GPMC) under Computer Configuration > Administrative Templates > Windows Components > BitLocker Drive Encryption. The following policy settings define the recovery methods that can be used to restore access to a BitLocker-protected drive if an authentication method fails or is unable to be used.


In each of these policies, select Save BitLocker recovery information to Active Directory Domain Services and then choose which BitLocker recovery information to store in AD DS. Check the Do not enable BitLocker until recovery information is stored in ADDS check box if it's desired to prevent users from enabling BitLocker unless the computer is connected to the domain and the backup of BitLocker recovery information for the drive to AD DS succeeds.


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